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This paper examines the relationship between exchange rate 
movement and individual company's valuation, or exchange rate 
exposure, in a small open developing economy, specifically South 
Korea.  This paper finds that about 20% of the Korean company's 
stock performance is statistically significantly impacted by the 
exchange rate fluctuations.  This paper also finds that there is a 
structural change in the relationship between the exchange rate return 
and the stock returns before and after the economic crisis.  One of the 
interesting findings of this paper is that the currency depreciation has 
significantly different impact on the larger companies and on the 
smaller companies.  Before the economic crisis, the currency 
depreciation has improved the smallest 50 companies ' competitiveness 
in the international markets, thus improving their stock returns.  After 
the crisis, the stock returns of the smallest 50 companies are negatively 
correlated to the currency depreciation.  This is largely due to the 
short-term foreign debt obligations, recessionary economic conditions, 
and government's policy heavily favoring larger chaebol companies 
during the economic crisis period. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely believed that the exchange rate movement is closely related to 
a country's macroeconomic performance.  The exchange rate is one of the 
most important prices in the country.  It is the price of one country's 
currency in terms of another, and, as such, it converts prices denominated in 
one currency into prices denominated in another currency.  Changes in the 
exchange rate should therefore have a fundamental effect on the country's 
macroeconomic policy variables.  At the microeconomic level, there can 
also be a significant impact on the performance of companies involved in 
international activities.  For example, currency depreciation will increase 
the competitiveness of a country's export industry by reducing the cost of 
exports while currency appreciation will help import industry by reducing the 
import prices.  There have been several studies examining how this 
macroeconomic effect is transmitted into the valuation of individual 
company at the microeconomic level, especially for the multinational 
companies.   
Recent studies, Jorin (1990), Amihud (1994), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), 
Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996), Bodnar and Wong (2000) and Gao (2000), 
have empirically examined U.S. multinational companies' exchange rate 
exposures, i.e., the relationship between changes in the value of the U.S. 
dollar and the changes in the value of the companies measured by stock 
prices.  Huang and Stoll (1996) used high frequency data to examine the 
relationship between exchange rate and company's stock performance.  
However, most of these studies found very little evidence between the 
exchange rate movement and the company's valuation.  Bartov and Bodnar 
(1994) extended the previous study by examining not only the 
contemporaneous changes in the exchange rate but also the lagged change of 
the exchange rate.  They achieved modestly limited success to link the 
exchange rate movement and the company's valuation by using the lagged 
exchange rate movement.  Bondar and Wong (2000) also achieved a modest 
success on explaining the exchange rate movement and company's market 
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valuation using different measures of market portfolio and analyzing size 
effect on the exchange rate exposure.  Gao (2000) reexamined the foreign 
exchange rate exposure for U.S. multinational companies and found the time 
variability of exchange rate exposure by taking into account firms' foreign 
sales and foreign production information.  In contrast to these results, 
Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) found statistical significances between the 
exchange rates and stock returns using six import competing industry level 
data. 
There are various explanations about why it is hard to find statistically 
significant evidence between exchange rate movement and the company's 
valuation, even though economic theory clearly indicates the relationship.  
First, multinational companies often reduce their foreign exchange exposure 
by diversifying their operations across different countries.  This is 
accomplished by optimally locating production facilities, sources of inputs, 
and markets for their products.  Thus, the valuation effect of the exchange 
rate movement may be offset over time as companies undertake the 
operational changes in response to exchange rate movement.  Second, 
companies engage active risk management and hedge foreign exchange 
exposure through financial instruments that offset adverse valuation effects 
of exchange rate movement.  Third, the empirical estimates of the effect of 
the exchange rate change do not capture true effect of the exchange rate 
change.  The state of the nature of exchange rate exposure may be time-
varying while the majority of existing study did not take this into 
consideration.  Levi (1994), Amihud (1994) and Jorin (1990, 1991) partially 
confirmed the time-varying nature of the exchange rate exposure, and Gao 
(2000) considered the time variability of exchange rate exposure using 
detailed company level data for la rge U.S. multinationals.  In short, while a 
company's specific economic activity, when examined in isolation, is clearly 
affected by exchange rate movement, for a company as a whole, its foreign 
exchange rate exposure may be small or non-existence due to the 
complicating forces canceling with each other. 
This paper examines the relationship between exchange rate movement 
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and individual company's valuation, or exchange rate exposure, in a small 
open developing economy, specifically South Korea.  This measure is called 
the exchange rate exposure elasticity, and it will serve as an important 
measure to each company's responsiveness to the foreign exchange volatility.   
One of the reasons that many of the previous studies fail to find a significant 
connection between exchange rate movement and a company's valuation is 
that the majority of the previous studies focus on large U.S. multinational 
companies that typically have a relatively small share of foreign operations 
compare to the entire company's operation.  In addition, their operations 
(production facilities and markets) are well diversified around the world, 
which provides natural hedging instrument, physically and financially.  
Bodnar and Gentry (1993) estimated exchange rate exposure in three 
countries, Canada, Japan and U.S.  Khoo (1994) studies the Australian 
mining companies, traditionally thought to be very sensitive to the exchange 
rate movements.  Other than these two studies, there are virtually no studies 
examining the companies in the small open economy that is more sensitive to 
the exchange rate fluctuations than the large US multinational companies. 
The next section briefly summarizes the characteristics of the Korean 
economy and the recent experiences of the Korean economic crisis and the 
more widespread South Eastern Asian economic crisis.  Section 3 presents 
the analytical model and the data set.  Section 4 is an empirical analysis of 
the exchange rates and the individual company relationship in Korean 
economy during the recent economic crisis.  Conclusion and further studies 
are discussed in section 5. 
 
 
2. KOREAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
Korea is heavily dependent on the international trade for her economic 
survival since the early stages of the economic development from the 1960s.  
Therefore, it is quite natural that most of Korean companies have a large 
share of foreign operations compared to large U.S. multinational companies.  
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In addition to the significant shares of foreign sales to total sales, Korean 
companies import a large portion of critical intermediate goods to produce 
the final goods.   Also, the majority of the Korean companies do not have 
sophisticated foreign currency hedging operations like many of the 
multinational US companies have.  Thus, Korean companies in a small open 
economic structure are expected to show more dramatic effect from exchange 
rate movement than the large U.S. multinational companies.  In addition, 
many Korean companies, including the large companies, so-called "chaebol" 
companies, and small ones, have significant amount of foreign debts 
denominated in various foreign currencies.  This is largely due to the 
growth oriented expansionary policy supported by the implicit government 
guarantee of the foreign debt.  This is the often-cited "moral hazard" 
problem, which was one of the main causes of the recent economic crisis.  
Therefore, the valuation of Korean companies is very sensitive to the foreign 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
In the wake of the recent Korean economic crisis starting in the late 1997, 
numerous companies in Korea went bankrupt as a result of the currency and 
banking crises.  In the early stage of the Korean economic crisis, large 
chaebol companies like Hanbo Steel and Kia Motors, once virtually 
guaranteed by the government (too-big-to-fail), sought protection from 
creditors after banks refused to extend their short-term debts.  A large share 
of those debts is denominated in foreign currencies, and companies were not 
able to repay short-term debts due to the foreign reserve shortages.  During 
the economic crisis periods, Korean companies experienced severe liquidity 
problems due to the large foreign debt-servicing obligation, thus crippling 
their normal economic operations.  Even recently, there were several 
notable failures and severe financial crisis of large chaebol companies in 
Korea such as Hyundai Electronics and Daewoo Motors. 
There have been numerous studies on the causes and consequences of the 
Korean and other Asian economic crisis.  Among others, G. Corsetti, P. 
Pesenti and N. Roubini (1998), S. Radelet and J. Sachs (1998), and P. 
Krugman (1998) analyzed the causes of the Asian economic crisis in general, 
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mostly focusing on the macroeconomic conditions. D. Cho (1999), J. Hahn 
and F. Mishkin (2000), and H. Root (2000) investigated the specific problems 
of South Korean economy. K. Kim and B. Lee (2000) analyzed the Korean 
economic development and the recent economic crisis focusing on the 
government role of the economy.  However, the majority of studies focused 
on the macroeconomic aspects of the economic crisis.  This paper focuses 
on the microeconomic level impact of the economic crisis, more specifically, 
the impact of the exchange rate movement on the individual company.  It is 
very important to understand the relationship between the exchange rate 
movement and company's valuation.  This relationship will tell whether an 
individual company has a proper risk diversification through foreign 
currency hedging operations.   
A brief summary of the Korean macroeconomic conditions will help 
understand the microeconomic analysis of the exchange rate and the stock 
market index.  The steady growth of the Korean economy during 1990s 
came to a screeching halt in 1997-1998.  The real GDP has grown over 5% 
throughout early to middle 1990s but it shrank to 5.8% in 1998.  The 
unemployment rate increased from the low 2% during the middle 1990s to 
7% in 1998.  Foreign debt has increased to $158 billions at the end of 1997.  
The following figure will give you a brief idea how exchange rates and 
Korean stock market index have evolved throughout the 1990s of tranquil 
periods and turmoil periods. 
From Figure 1, it is clear that the nominal exchange rates were stable from 
early 1990s to the middle of 1997.  These are the periods of the managed 
floating exchange regime of the Korean Won.  The market average 
exchange rate (MAR) system was adopted in March 1990.  Under the MAR 
regime, the Korean exchange rate has been determined primarily by the 
market forces, with the occasional governmental intervention throughout the 
early to the middle 1990s.  When the economic crisis hit the South Eastern 
Asian region during the early and the middle of 1997, Korean Won has been 
depreciated sharply, and the MAR system could not be maintained.  In 
December 1997, the free floating exchange rate system was adopted to  
Exchange Rate Exposure of Korean Companies 289 
Figure 1  Rate of Return for the Monthly Nominal Exchange Rate  
(Won/Dollar) and the Korean Stock Market Index  
(KOSPI) beginning January 1990 to August 2000 
 
)ln()ln( 1--= tt KOSPIKOSPIKOSPIR , )ln()ln( 1--= tt teExchangeRateExchangeRaEXCH  
 
determine the nominal exchange rate.  Since then, the Korean Won 
depreciated from around \ 800/$ to \ 2,000/$ at the end of 1997, and 
gradually stabilized around \ 1,200-1,400/$ in 1998 and after.   
Throughout the 1990s, Korean stock market index was much more volatile 
than the nominal exchange rates.  The volatility has increased dramatically 
after the economic crisis.  During this period, the returns of the stock market 
index and the exchange rate (KOSPIR and EXCH) are negatively correlated 
with correlation coefficient of –0.33.  When we break 1990s into two sub-
periods, tranquil period and turmoil (crisis) period, where July 1997 is the 
beginning of the economic crisis, the tranquil period still has the negative 
correlation coefficient of –0.22, and the negative correlation coefficient 
between these two variables even increases (in absolute value) to –0.39 
during the crisis period.   
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To investigate the causal relationship between key macroeconomic 
variables, the followings are two simple summary regressions among the 
returns of three variables, stock market index (KOSPIR), nominal exchange 
rate of Won per US dollar (EXCH), and nominal interest rate (INTR).  
KOSPIR and EXCH are rate of returns expressed as the first difference of the 
natural log of level variables.  The OLS regression specification and 
estimation results are as following: 
 
ttttt INTREXCHEXCHKOSPIR ebbbb ++++= - 31210 . 
 
Table 1  OLS Results  
 All period Pre-Crisis After-Crisis 
Constant 0.0097(0.0067) 0.0172(0.0125) 0.0091(0.0099) 
EXCH(t) -0.7629(0.0829)* -0.2259(0.2553) -0.7885(0.1171)* 
EXCH(t-1) 0.2364(0.0830)* 0.1117(0.2553) 0.2456(0.1171)* 
INTR -3.8912(2.6338) -6.2150(4.6555) -4.9171(4.3727) 
F-signif. (p-value) 0.0000 0.4324 0.0000 
Note: Pre-crisis: January 1992-June 1997, After-crisis: July 1997-September 2000.  Standard 
errors are in the parenthesis.  '*' indicates 5% statistical significance. 
 
These regression results are consistent with findings of the simple 
correlation between those variables.   Stock market index is negatively 
associated on the contemporaneous lag and positively associated on the first 
lag by the depreciation of the nominal exchange rates.  This could be due to 
the time-lagged response of the exchange rate to the stock market, so-called 
the J-curve theory.  Before the crisis period, depreciation still had the 
negative impact on the stock price even though it was not statistically 
significant.  However, after the crisis, the negative impact of the 
depreciation is much more pronounced and statistically significant than 
before the crisis period.  Interest rate remained unimportant to the stock 
market throughout the entire period. 
In the OLS specification, we assume that the direction of causation goes 
form the exchange rate and interest rate to the stock market.  To avoid this 
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arbitrary specification, we estimate the vector autoregression (VAR) model of 
three variables as following. 
 
tptpttt YAYAYAY e++++= --- L2211 . 
 
tY  is 3x1 vector of three endogenous variables (in the order of INTR, 
EXCH, KOSPIR) expressed as the rate of return, pAAA ,,, 21 L  are 
matrices of coefficients, and te  is a vector of white-noise innovations that 
may be contemporaneously correlated with each other but uncorrelated with 
their lagged values.  In the VAR estimation, the parameter estimates are 
oftentimes of the secondary importance, and we are more interested in the 
causal relationship among dependent variables.  The followings are the 
Granger-causality test results for the VAR using 4 lagged values. 
 
Table 2  All period 
Lagged Var\Dependent INTR EXCH KOSPIR 
INTR 5424.9646(0.0000) 2.7500(0.0278) 0.0793(0.5301) 
EXCH 26.2599(0.0000) 4.1282(0.0027) 3.6385(0.0063) 
KOSPIR 0.9242(0.4496) 3.3597(0.0100) 2.9678(0.0194) 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are p-values. 
 
Table 3  Pre -Crisis  
Lagged Var\Dependent INT R EXCH KOSPIR 
INTR 982.1337(0.00000) 0.7003(0.5924) 0.9074(0.4601) 
EXCH 1.5483(0.1885) 5.4535(0.0003) 1.3781(0.2418) 
KOSPIR 0.5489(0.7000) 2.4643(0.0455) 0.6938(0.5968) 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are p-values. 
 
Table 4  After-Crisis  
Lagged Var\Dependent INTR EXCH KOSPIR 
INTR 3581.8350(0.00000) 2.3866(0.0535) 0.7738(0.5438) 
EXCH 23.2859(0.00000) 1.7063(0.1513) 2.0234(0.0938) 
KOSPIR 0.7149(0.5830) 1.3734(0.2456) 1.9903(0.0986) 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are p-values.  
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Figure 2  Response of INTR to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Tables 3, we can see that the Korean stock market was not affected 
by the exchange rate before the crisis, but after the crisis, from Table 4, the 
exchange rate now affect the returns of the stock market at the 10% 
significance level.  The useful aspect of the VAR analysis is that we can 
investigate the impact of each variable to the other variable using the impulse 
response function.  For conveniences, we will assume that the ordering of 
innovations follows from INTR, EXCH and KOSPIR, and use the Cholesky 
decomposition to produce the one standard deviation impulse response 
functions for the entire periods (before and after the crisis). 
From Figures 2 to 4, we can see that the impact of the external shocks to 
stock market and exchange rate is quickly diminishing while the impact to 
the interest rate appears to be long lasting.  This tells us that the stock 
market and exchange rates adjust quickly to the external shocks, but once the 
interest rate has been affected by the external shock, interest rate contains the 
effect of the shocks fairly long period of time. 
In a macroeconomic context, interest rate did not appear to be significant 
for the stock market performances, while exchange rates have different 
impact on the stock market before and after the economic crisis.  It is 
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Figure 3  Response of EXCH to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Response of KOSPIR to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interesting to see whether the similar relationship exists in the 
microeconomic context.  For example, how exchange rate fluctuations 
affect individual company stock prices or the relationship between the 
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This paper mainly focuses on the microeconomic impact of the exchange 
rates on the individual company.  It is also very interesting to compare the 
responses of the individual company's valuation to the foreign exchange 
movement before and after the economic crisis.  One of the several 
hypotheses to test in this paper is that Korean companies' market valuation to 
the exchange rate exposure behaves differently before and after the economic 
crisis.  Before the economic crisis, export-oriented Korean companies 
responded pos itively (increase of the company's valuation) to the currency 
depreciation and negatively (decrease of company's valuation) to the 
currency appreciation.  This is the expected consequence of the exchange 
rate movement under the normal economic conditions.  However, when 
economic crisis hits the Korean economy, and the domestic currency 
depreciates, company's foreign denominated debt overburdens its normal 
economic operation and cash flow, thus crippling company's economic 
activity, and its fvaluation plummets.  This is also largely due to the erosion 
of investors' confidence on Korean companies during the economic crisis and 
recession period.  In this scenario, the standard economic theory fails to 
explain company specific response to the exchange rate fluctuations.  
Therefore, this paper will investigate the time varying nature of the foreign 
exchange rate exposure elasticity before and after the Korean economic crisis.  
This paper will help identify an individual company's exposure elasticity and 
give appropriate strategic recommendations about the foreign operations 
depending on the company characteristics. 
Next section develops the econometric models to estimate the exchange 
rate exposure, and the detailed description of the data set used in this study.  
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3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF EXCHANGE RATE  
EXPOSURE 
 
The basic econometric model is based on the market model of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with exchange rate change being additional 
explanatory variable.  Individual company's excess stock return is a function 
of the excess market return and the exchange rate return.  The estimation 
model is: 
 
 ( ) ittiftmtiiftit errrr egba +×+-×+=- .           (1) 
 
In this model, itr  is company i's stock rate of return at time t, mtr  is the 
market rate of return at time t, ftr  is the risk-free interest rate, and te  is 
the rate of change of exchange rate (Korean Won/US $).  The rate of returns 
for company, market and the exchange rate are measured as the natural log 
difference between time t and (t-1) ( ( ) ( ),lnln 1, --= tiitit PPr  ln=mtr  
),ln()( 1-- tt KOSPIKOSPI  and )ln()ln( 1--= ttt ExRExRe ). The risk-
free rate, ,ftr  is the 91 day direct deposit rate.  )( ftit rr -  is an excess rate 
of stock return for company i and )( ftmt rr -  is the excess market return. 
ib  measures company i's systematic market risk, and ig  is company i's 
exchange rate exposure elasticity.  In a typical market model, the 
unsystematic component is .ittiit eu eg +×=  In this model, we would like 
to separate the exchange rate effect component from the total unsystematic 
components of the fluctuation.  Since the exchange rate is measured as 
Korean Won per US dollar, the increase of te  represents the depreciation of 
Korean Won against US dollar.  Under the normal macro economic 
conditions, when Korean Won depreciates, Korean export price becomes 
cheaper and more competitive in the international market.  The currency 
depreciation will help export companies' sales and their cash flow.  This 
will increase the (discounted) present value of the company and eventually 
lead to the increase of the company's stock price.  Therefore, we expect the 
estimates of ig  to be positive under the normal economic conditions.  
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However, after the recent Asian economic crisis, company's foreign debt 
burden may have overwhelmed any positive cash flow effect of the currency 
depreciation.  Therefore, we expect that the economic crisis has the negative 
impact on the ig .  This will help test the time-varying nature of the 
exchange rate exposure before and after the economic crisis. 
The econometric model is estimated by the two-stage estimation process 
suggested by Levinsohn and MacKie-Mason (1990) due to the bias problem 
of ig  estimation from equation (1).  The first stage estimates the market 
model without the exchange rate changes.  Then, we can estimate the 
unsystematic or company specific fluctuation from the market model.  The 
exchange rate exposure will be estimated in the second stage using the 
residuals (unsystematic fluctuations) from the first stage regression as:  
 
)(ˆˆ)(ˆ ftmtiiftitit rrrru -×---= ba .               (2) 
 
In the second stage, the unsystematic risk is regressed on the several 
lagged values of the return of the exchange rate changes.  The second stage 
regression with q lagged values of the return of the exchange rate is as 
follows:  
å
=
+- ++=
q
j
itjtjit eu
1
10ˆ dgg .                   (3)  
This regression provides the unbiased estimates of elasticity of the 
exchange rate exposure, ig . 
The data comes from the DataStream.  The variables that we used in this 
analysis are: individual company stock price )( itP , Korean stock market 
index (KOSPIt), total market valuation for each company measured as the 
stock price multiplied by the total number of the outstanding shares, and the 
official nominal exchange rate measured as the Korean Won per US dollar 
(ExRt).  Data frequency is monthly and data period starts from the beginning 
of 1990 when Korea opened her economy in a limited sense, and ends at 
August 2000 (128 monthly observations).  Korean economic crisis began in 
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early September 1997.  However, the general economic conditions in the 
South Eastern Asia began to deteriorate in the early and the middle of 1997.  
Therefore, the data is divided into two periods, before crisis and after crisis at 
the beginning of July 1997.  There are 722 companies listed in the Korean 
Stock Exchange at the end of August 2000. However, in order to compare the 
before and after economic crisis effect of the exchange rate changes properly, 
we restrict our sample to companies with the complete price information for 
the entire period beginning January 1990 to August 2000.  This reduces our 
sample to 506 companies.  The list of companies includes large chaebol 
companies (such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motor) as well as small to 
medium companies.  This list also includes all branches of Korean 
industries from banking, textiles to petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Exchange rate exposure will be different from one company to another 
depending on its characteristics.  Therefore, I would like to examine how 
certain company specific characteristics such as company size will affect the 
exchange rate exposure.  In the small open developing economy, the bigger 
company tends to have more foreign operations than a smaller company does.  
We expect that the larger company will be more sensitive to the exchange 
rate fluctuations.  In the South Eastern Asian developing countries, it is true 
that the larger companies have accumulated more foreign debts for the rapid 
expansion under the implicit government loan guarantee.  They are the ones 
that have the so-called moral hazard problem.  However, as we have seen in 
the previous literature, large multinational companies have well diversified 
their foreign exchange exposure physically and financially.  Therefore, it 
was very hard to find the empirical evidence of the foreign exchange 
exposure.  It will be interesting to see whether the larger companies in the 
small open developing countries have the similar sophistication of the large 
US multinationals to diversify foreign exchange risks. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE EXCHANGE RATE 
EXPOSURE ELASTICITY 
 
This section reports detailed empirical findings of the exchange rate 
exposure elasticity of Korean companies before and after the economic crisis.  
First, we estimated the market model for two sub periods to see if there were 
any statistically significant structural changes before and after the Korean 
economic crisis.  This model is estimated by using the dummy variable to 
distinguish two sub periods. 
 
( ) ( ) itftmtliiftmtiiftit rrddrrrr ebaba +-××+×+-×+=- 100 ,    (4) 
 
where the dummy variable  d equals to one for crisis period (from July 1997 
to August 2000), and zero otherwise.  This model will help to distinguish 
the structural changes of the market model and provides the statistical tools 
to test the hypothesis of the structural changes.  Equation (4) is estimated by 
the simple least squares estimation.  White's (1980) heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance estimation method is used to estimate the consistent 
covariance matrix of the parameters.  The estimation results are reported in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5  Estimates of the Market Model with Crisis Dummy 
 
Parameters Mean Standard Statistical Significance 
  Deviation P05% P10% N05% N10% 
0a  0.0009 0.0100 2 6 5 19 
0b  0.8025 0.2444 481 491 0 0 
1a  -0.0276 0.0001 0 0 12 38 
1b  0.0997 0.3189 24 40 7 14 
Note: Mean estimates are the sample average of 506 company's estimates for 128 monthly 
observations.  For example, 
.0009.0ˆ506
1ˆ
506
1
00 å
=
==
i
iaa
  The standard deviation is the 
standard deviation of 506 estimates.  The numbers in the statistical significance columns 
(P05%, P10%, N05%, N10%) are the number of estimates that are statistically significant 
at 5% and 10% for positive and negative values. 
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Table 6  Estimates of the Market Model without Crisis Dummy 
 
Parameters Mean Standard Statistical Significance 
  Deviation P05% P10% N05% N10% 
0a  -0.0073 0.0112 2 4 14 26 
0b  0.8676 0.2454 481 488 0 0 
Note: Mean of 506 companies for 128 monthly observations. 
 
This table reports that the average market beta )( 0b  of 506 companies is 
0.8025 and its standard deviation is 0.2444.  Also, it reports that 491 out of 
506 company's betas are statistically significant at 90%.  For dummy 
variable parameters, we can see that none of the intercept dummy parameters 
)( 1a  are positively statistically significant while 24 out of 506 companies 
beta dummies are statistically significant at 5%.  These results show that the 
market model was generally stable for the majority (more than 95%) of 
companies before and after the economic crisis.  The market stability 
hypothesis is tested as follows.  The null hypothesis is: .0: 110 == baH  
For all 506 companies, 27 companies rejected this hypothesis using F-test at 
5% significance level.  This is slightly greater than 5% of the total 
companies, so we can reasonably consider this as the random variation.  
Therefore, to test the exchange rate exposure elasticity, we used the stable 
market model for the entire periods and obtained the residual from the single 
market model.  The estimation result is reported in Table 6.  The residual 
from the stable market model is used in the second stage regression to 
estimate the exchange rate exposure elasticity. 
In the second stage regression, various specifications of the lagged values 
of the return rate of the exchange rate are considered.   The same dummy 
variable is used to distinguish the effect of the economic crisis.  The second 
stage regression model is: 
åå
=
+-
=
+- +××+××+=
q
j
itjtj
q
j
jtjit eddeu
1
1101
1
1000ˆ dgggg .      (5) 
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Table 7   Exchange Rate Exposure Elasticity without Crisis Dummy 
Parameters Mean Standard  Statistical Significance 
  Deviation P05% P10% N05% N10% 
00g  0.0032 0.0041 0 0 0 0 
01g  -0.5585 0.5922 11 12 176 220 
02g  -0.1871 0.4788 26 39 79 108 
03g  -0.0826 0.4755 44 56 61 92 
04g  0.3309 0.5009 116 162 9 14 
05g  -0.4224 0.5215 11 11 147 182 
Note: Mean of 506 companies for 128 monthly observations. 
 
This regression is also estimated using the White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimation method.  For various 
specifications of the lag length, the estimation results are qualitatively similar 
and we chose the lag length 4 according to the Akaike information criteria.  
We estimate equation (5) for two separate models.  The first model does not 
include the crisis dummy and the second model includes the crisis dummy 
variable.  These two estimation results show interesting comparison of the 
structural changes of the before and after economic crisis.  The empirical 
results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8. 
Table 7 shows that the estimates of the exchange rate exposure elasticity 
throughout the 1990s are negative.  The contemporaneous, the first and the 
second lagged elasticity estimates are all negatives ,5585.001 -=g  =02g  
1871.0-  and )0826.003 -=g .  There are 220 and 108 companies 
statistically significant at 10% that have the negative contemporaneous and 
the first lagged elasticities.  The second lagged elasticity does not have any 
clear trend.  These results reveal that the Korean companies as a whole did 
not take advantage of the currency depreciation for the export competition 
throughout the 1990s.  This finding is similar to the macroeconomic 
evidence that we have seen in Section 2.  As we have seen the J-curve effect 
of the relationship, from this result, we can see that the time-lagged J-curve 
effect is much longer here, and the positive impact of depreciation is very 
short lived (only 04g  is positive and 05g  again turns to negative).   
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Table 8  Exchange Rate Exposure Elasticity with Crisis Dummy 
Parameters Mean Standard Statistical Significance 
  Deviation P05% P10% N05% N10% 
00g  0.0055 0.0105 17 36 0 0 
01g  0.3097 1.4606 20 38 14 26 
02g  1.0932 1.5738 64 117 7 12 
03g  -0.7351 1.5175 4 10 65 85 
04g  -0.3049 1.2947 6 17 20 44 
05g  0.7477 1.3617 50 80 4 6 
10g  -0.0191 0.0281 0 0 6 24 
11g  -0.8914 1.5850 8 14 51 83 
12g  -1.3188 1.7388 8 12 89 143 
13g  0.6789 1.5180 48 78 7 8 
14g  0.6574 1.4257 47 83 5 10 
15g  -1.2031 1.4595 1 2 86 116 
Note: Mean of 506 companies for 128 monthly observations (90 for pre-crisis, 38 for post-crisis). 
 
However, if we introduce the structural breakdown for the dramatic changes 
of the macroeconomic conditions, there are very different and interesting 
results.   
Table 8 reveals very interesting empirical evidences different from those 
of Table 7.  First of all, the contemporaneous (lag zero) and the lag one 
exchange rate exposure elasticities are positive =01(g 3097.0  and =02g  
)0932.1 before the economic crisis and their corresponding dummy 
parameters measuring the effect of the economic crisis are negative =11(g  
8914.0-  and )3188.112 -=g . This explains the effect of the exchange 
rate changes on the company valuation in the stock market.  Before the 
economic crisis, the depreciation (positive return of the exchange rate 
changes) increases the company valuations immediately in general, thus the 
positive parameters for the contemporaneous and the first lag variables.  
However, after the economic crisis, the depreciation affects the company 
valuation negatively.  This is largely explained by the heavy debt burden 
denominated by the foreign currencies.  On the eve of the economic crisis, 
large Korean company's debt equity ratio was about 500%, far greater than 
the international norm.  Even though the statistical significance of the 
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parameters is not very impressive, it is still a very important finding that we 
verified our conjecture that the exchange rate elasticity exposure has changed 
its sign after the economic crisis.  For the first lagged elasticity estimates, 
we have 117 positively statistically significant at 10% significance level 
while 143 companies have negatively statistically significant dummy 
parameter estimates after the economic crisis.  They represent 
approximately less than 30% of the entire 506 companies.  But it is well 
documented that it is not unusual for failure of finding any meaningful 
statistical estimates for the exchange rate elasticities due to the complicated 
nature of company operations and sophisticated hedging strategies to 
diversify exchange rate risks.  To examine more details about the company 
specific exchange rate exposure elasticity, the following four Figures show 
the empirical distributions of the current and the first lag parameters before 
and the after the economic crisis. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the empirical distributions of the current and the first 
lagged parameters for the exchange rate exposures before economic crisis.  
Even though there are only 38 and 117 statistically significant parameters, 
respectively, at 10% significance level, they have positive means 
3097.0( 01 =g and )0932.102 =g and positive skewness (0.2400 and 0.5410). 
Figure 2  Empirical Distribution of 01g  ( 01g = Series B22) 
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Figure 3  Empirical Distribution of 02g  ( 02g = Series B23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Empirical Distribution of 11g  ( 11g = Series B32) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5  Empirical Distribution of 12g  ( 12g = Series B33) 
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Figures 4 and 5 are the empirical distributions of the current and the first 
lagged dummy interaction parameters for the exchange rate exposures after 
the economic crisis.   They have negative means =11(g 8914.0- and 
)3188.1( 12 -=g , and negative skewness 2651.0(-  and )4668.0- . 
From Table 8, we can also find that the current and the first lagged 
exchange rate changes affect company valuations most.  In fact, the second 
and the third lagged parameters have the opposite signs from the current and 
the first lagged parameters.  These signs turn from positive to negative 
before the crisis while they turn from negative to positive after the crisis.   
The depreciation of the Korean currency against the US dollar affected 
companies negatively even before the economic crisis.  This explains the 
fragile nature of the Korean companies' financial structure.  Many Korean 
companies have operated under the large amount of foreign debt and most of 
the debts were short-term debts.  Even before the economic crisis, the 
benefits of the currency depreciation are short lived.  While the currency 
depreciation increased company's competitiveness for the short-term period, 
after few months later, the depreciated currency quickly turned into the 
negative factors as it increased the short-term debt servicing obligations.  In 
fact, they are financially strapped by any foreign currency fluctuations.   
To test the structural changes of the relationship between the unsystematic 
risk and the rate of the exchange rate before and after the economic crisis, F-
test was performed for the null hypothesis. ==== 131211100 : ggggH  
01514 == gg .  We rejected the null hypothesis 127 out of 506 companies at 
5% (one-sided) significance level, and 181 companies at 10% significance 
level.  This represents about 25% to 35% of all sample companies.  While 
this result does not seem to be very impressive, this finding produces much 
better results than any of the existing studies regarding the exchange rate 
exposure elasticity estimation.  One of the reasons for this success may be 
that the majority of the Korean companies, large and small, rely heavily on 
the international trade, and they are very sensitive to the foreign currency 
fluctuations. 
While Table 8 provides the summary statistics for the parameter estimates 
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of the exchange rate exposure elasticity of the Korean companies, it is very 
hard to find any specific characteristics of individual company.  In order to 
investigate more detailed characteristics of the exchange rate exposure 
elasticity, two sub samples are constructed: the top 50 largest companies and 
the bottom 50 companies according to the market valuation at the end of 
December 1996.  December 1996 valuation was used to distinguish the top 
50 and bottom 50 companies because the next several months have brought 
the dramatic changes of the economic conditions throughout the South 
Eastern Asia.  Before 1997, it was still stable and tranquil period for the 
region.  If there are any differences to the exchange rate changes between 
large companies and small companies, these two sub samples will contrast 
the differences.  The following figures show very interesting results for the 
estimates of these two sub samples.  Figures 6 to 9 show the empirical 
distributions of the exchange rate exposure elasticities for the top 50 largest 
companies.  From Figures 6 and 7, it is very clear that the largest companies 
react negatively to the exchange rate depreciation even before the economic 
crisis.  This is very different from the previous findings for the entire 
Korean companies.  In general, the majority of the export oriented Korean 
companies reacted favorably to the exchange rate depreciation before the 
crisis.  Figures 10 and 11 for the smallest 50 companies confirm our 
previous general findings that the currency depreciation will improve  
 
Figure 6  Empirical Distribution of the Contemporaneous  
Elasticity ( 01g ) for Top 50 Companies 
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Figure 7  Empirical Distribution of the First Lagged  
Elasticity ( 02g ) for Top 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8  Empirical Distribution of the Contemporaneous  
Dummy Elasticity for Top 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Empirical Distribution of the First Lagged Dummy 
Elasticity for Top 50 Companies 
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Figure 10  Empirical Distribution of the Contemporaneous  
Elasticity ( 01g ) for Bottom 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11  Empirical Distribution of the First Lagged  
Elasticity ( 02g ) for Bottom 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
company's stock performance.  However, after the economic crisis, the 
smallest 50 companies shown in Figures 12 and 13 react very negatively to 
the depreciation while the largest companies' reaction to the depreciation in 
Figures 8 and 9 is mildly positive.  These are very significant findings that 
have never been analyzed before.  Before the economic crisis, the smallest 
companies with the minimal debts took the full advantage of the currency 
depreciation to be more competitive in the international markets, the largest 
companies, mostly chaebols, were not able to take advantage of the favorable 
exchange rate changes due to the heavy foreign debts.  Their foreign debt 
servicing obligations overwhelmed the competitive advantages offered by the  
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Figure 12  Empirical Distribution of the Contemporaneous  
Dummy Elasticity for Bottom 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13  Empirical Distribution of the First Lagged Dummy  
Elasticity for Bottom 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
currency depreciation.  Another explanation of these results could be the 
impact of the financial market.  Foreign investors mainly hold the larger 
company stocks, and when the Korean Won depreciates, they hastily abandon 
those holdings for the fear of further erosion of the Korean economy.  
Therefore, the depreciation has the negative impact on the larger company 
stock valuations. 
However, after the economic crisis, while most of the smallest companies 
suffer heavily due to the general recession and the domestic economic 
downturn, the largest companies took advantage of this economic downturn.  
There could also be explained by the financial market effect.  After the 
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economic crisis, when the Won depreciation has been stabilized to its lowest 
is levels, stock prices in US dollar terms are doubly attractive due to the 
market slump and the exchange rates, foreign investors rush to accumulate 
Korean stocks mainly focusing on the larger and established companies.  
This is one of the reasons why the largest companies took advantage of the 
currency depreciation while most of the small companies suffer because of 
the recession.  Another possible answer to this phenomenon is the 
government policy.  After the economic crisis, Korean government policy 
turned favorably to the largest companies while neglecting the majority of 
the small companies.  In early 1998, the newly elected Korean government 
took the initiatives to reform the chaebol oriented industry structure making 
them more efficient and competitive companies, so-called the "Big Deals" 
policy.  This is the government-controlled industry restructuring policy, 
swapping assets of different companies of different industries among chaebol 
companies.  This policy is designed to eliminate unnecessary competitions 
among similar companies in the same industry, and to strengthen 
international competitiveness of the chaebol companies.  Asides from the 
evaluation of the Big-Deals policy, we can see from our empirical evidence 
that the larger chaebol companies have benefited from the fall of the Korean 
economy while the smaller companies are victims of the economic crisis.  
Government policy needs to focus more on the smaller companies to 
overcome economic hardship. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This paper analyzed the impact of the microeconomic structure of the 
Korean economic crisis.  To be more precise, this paper investigated the 
effect of the exchange rates on the individual company stock performances 
during the economic crisis.  For large US multinational companies, the 
currency fluctuation did not cause any statistically significant impact on the 
stock prices thanks to the sophisticated financial and geographical 
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diversifications.  This paper focuses on the companies in the small open 
economy, South Korea, that are much more highly exposed to the foreign 
currency fluctuations than US companies are. 
This paper found that about 20% of the Korean company's stock 
performance are statistically significantly impacted by the exchange rate 
fluctuations.  This paper found that there were structural changes in the 
relationship between the exchange rate return and the stock returns before 
and after the economic crisis.  Before the economic crisis, currency 
depreciation generally helped company stock performances, but after the 
crisis, this relationship has been significantly weakened, and the currency 
depreciation actually hurt the majority of the Korean companies. 
One of the interesting findings of this paper is that the currency 
depreciation has a significantly different impact on the larger companies and 
on the smaller companies.  For the top 50 largest companies, the currency 
depreciation hurt their stock performances before the crisis but helped them 
after the crisis.  Currency depreciation affected the smallest 50 companies 
exactly the opposite way of the largest 50 companies.  Before the crisis, the 
currency depreciation improved the smallest 50 companies' competitiveness 
in the international markets, thus improving their stock returns.  After the 
crisis, the stock returns of the smallest 50 companies are negatively 
correlated to the currency depreciation.  This is largely due to the short-term 
foreign debt obligations and the general economic conditions of the South 
Korea during the crisis period. 
This paper investigated the microeconomic relationships between the 
stock performance and the currency fluctuations focusing on the individual 
company.  We have found marginally statistically significant relationship 
between these two variables before and after the economic crisis.  However, 
from these results, it is very hard to draw any industry specific conclusions.  
Naturally, there are certain industries (Banking, Semi-conductor industries) 
that are more susceptible to the currency fluctuations than the other 
(Agricultural, Fisheries industries).  Therefore, it is the logical next step that 
we extend our current research into the industry specific relationships.  I 
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would like to extend the current research using the industry index rather than 
individual company stock prices. 
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